An Indelible Scar: Understanding the Economic Impact of the 1966 Constitutional Crisis on the Baganda

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Introduction

Nothing raises the emotions of ordinary Baganda as much as the memories of the outbreak of the 1966 Constitutional

Crisis. The crisis, which represented the climax of the political turmoil that characterised Uganda's first four years of independence, had significant short and long-term impacts on the well-being of the Baganda.

The aim of this chapter is to write the history of the economic impact of the 1966 Constitutional Crisis on the lives of ordinary Baganda. While the research draws on both secondary and primary sources, this social history benefited most from archival sources and the dynamic tool of oral history methodology. Oral history was used as a tool to interact with the people directly affected by the crisis.

This allowed the researcher to provide the specificities needed

ordinary people, especially in an area where conventional archival records reveal little about the nature and impact of economic effects. It provided insights into how the events of 1966 affected their economic well-being. The study reveals that the mayhem of 1966 left an indelible scar on the lives of ordinary Baganda as a people. It further reveals that in the aftermath of this Constitutional Crisis, the Baganda went through a distressful socio-economic life.

In the early morning of May 24, 1966, troops of the central government, led by Army Commander Major General Idi Amin, attacked the Lubiri (palace) of the Kabaka of Buganda located at Mengo. The attack on the official residence of the King of Buganda was done on the orders of the then Prime Minister of Uganda, Dr Apollo Milton Obote. This battle, which symbolised the ultimate attack on Buganda's civilisation and hegemony, was the culmination of a sequence of events that occurred between February 4 and May 24, 1966. These events included the parliamentary acceptance of the Amin Probe of the Congo plunder, Obote's arrest of his cabinet ministers, the suspension and subsequent abrogation of the 1962 Independence Constitution, and the May 20 Lukiiko Resolution ordering the central government's removal of its seat from Buganda. Significantly, for the first time in Uganda's short independence history, the state deliberately and systematically turned its guns on its people. This attack, which came to be known as the Battle at Mengo, epitomised the climax of the 1966 Constitutional Crisis.

It is worth noting that despite the preparations made by the departing British for Ugandans to embark on a successful independent unitary state, the country had a precarious beginning. The political machinations surrounding who would lead the first independent government compromised it. Several factions, motivated by political ambitions, soon began to struggle to change the 1962 constitutional order. For instance, with the 1964 breakup of the Kabaka Yekka/Uganda People's Congress (UPC) alliance

that had ushered in the 1962 coalition government, various issues came into play. Firstly, the Kabaka Yekka/UPC divorce led to a sharp divide within UPC, which was the ruling party then. It is important to note that UPC was an alliance between republicans and the monarchists. The monarchists sought to challenge Obote's leadership of the party, as eloquently documented in the work of Mutibwa (1992) and Ibingira (1973). Secondly, it renewed Buganda's opposition towards Obote's rule (Emambya Essazze 8th February 1965). This was the precarious state that the Ugandan nation found itself in 1966, barely four years after attaining independence.

As with the collection of historical data, this study has employed a qualitative research technique, a historical research methodology. Although the study of history is largely an intellectual and academic exercise, this research aimed not only to recapture the past but also to understand it through the perspectives of those who lived it. Consequently, the study relied heavily on primary data provided by archival records from the National Archive, the Lubaga Catholic Archive, Centre for Basic Research and the National Parliament Archives. Official documents and a record of eyewitnesses through oral history were also interrogated and consent of participation was sought from the respondents. This was intended to get insights of the impact of the 1966 Crisis through the eyes of the ordinary Baganda. The relevance of the historical method is highlighted by Amin (2005), who contends that studying documents, relics, and interviews enables us to understand the past. Kirti (2010) further points out that this method is not merely a compilation of past data but a dynamic account of events and interpretations that help us understand the nuances, personalities, and ideas that influenced them.

It is important to note that the Baganda benefited immensely from both missionary activities in the kingdom and the colonial era. According to Karugire (2010), Buganda was the largest, wealthiest,

most advanced, and strategically placed kingdom in Uganda; and the signing of the 1900 Agreement bestowed upon it a special status in the Ugandan colony. This special status was symbolised by the fact that it was the only protectorate in the colony. The missionaries also made a fundamental contribution to the advancement of Buganda by introducing formal education and the cash crop economy, which ensured that Buganda obtained the most benefit with the first schools and the largest concentration of educational institutions, at the expense of other regions. Indeed, at the time of independence, the southerners, particularly the Baganda, were the most educated (Mutibwa, 1992).

Furthermore, in an effort to make the Uganda Protectorate economically self-sustaining, the British colonial administrators singled out agriculture as the cornerstone of the economic policy (MAK. AR/BUG/23/5 History of the cotton industry). The switch to a cash crop economy created sufficient wealth for the Baganda (Kabwegyere, 1990). It is important to realise that all the chief cash crops of Uganda, namely coffee, tea, sugar, tobacco, and cotton, were successfully grown in Buganda (MAK.AR/BUG/6/9 Agriculture in Buganda). Owing from the developed agricultural sector, Buganda was naturally in the lead due to its wealth and prosperity generated from agricultural production, which was spent on various items that uplifted the standards of living of the people. They were able to invest their wealth in their children's education, providing leadership in both agricultural production and education in the new country of Uganda.

Notably, up to 1966, Buganda had a flourishing economy. The region had the best road system in the country, with most of the major roads originating from or passing through Kampala, Uganda's capital city located in Buganda. In Uganda, the railway line also originated and passed through Buganda (Mutibwa, 1992). The good transport network and numerous opportunities provided by

the capital city in the 1960s helped the kingdom to become the hub of economic activities in Uganda. However, the 1966 political turmoil was pivotal in the history of the kingdom because thereafter, it became a shell of its former glory.

The Crisis and the Buganda Economy

Aware of the fact that his political victory over the Baganda at the Battle of Mengo in May 1966 had not been enough to subdue them, President Apollo Milton Obote planned to economically weaken the once most commercially powerful ethnic group in Uganda (Mazrui 1975). This was to be achieved through the implementation of various policies and administrative pronouncements. As the 1966 Constitution Crisis evolved, Obote gradually moved to block the economic aspirations of the Baganda. Under the 1966 Interim Constitution, Obote took over the control and management of Buganda's financial resources, claiming that this step had been taken to safeguard against misuse of public funds that would otherwise have been beneficial to the general public. Obote had the following to say about the absence of the central government's firm financial control over Buganda:

> In this way, a handful of individuals can, and have used their power to frustrate progressive policy. In some of the federal states (specifically Buganda) large sums of money have been proved to have been misspent and the general public is being prevented from knowing exactly what is taking place. Those who have spent such amounts without authority cannot be taken to court because of their constitutional positions. Some federal assemblies have been requested to vote money for development projects, but such monies have found their way into personal overseas banking accounts of certain individuals (Speech by Hon. Prime Minster Milton Obote on March 3, 1966, ENA, 21153, Collections of the office of the President, Broadcasts by Prime Minister).

The shift led to the loss of the financial autonomy previously enjoyed by the Buganda government. Under the 1962

Independence Constitution, the Buganda government had the mandate to spend the kingdom's financial resources without the consent of the central government, even though 40 per cent of the resources were provided by the central government. However, the Special Schedule 9 of the Independence Constitution, which regulated the financial relationship between Buganda and the central government, was scrapped, thereby altering the financial relationship between the two. Chapter X of Schedule 9 of the Independence Constitution, Subsection 109 stated that "where a Federal State (in this case Buganda) has the power to collect and retain the proceeds of any tax, such a provision cannot be altered by or under any Act of Parliament to the disadvantage of that Federal State without the concurrence of the Government of that Federal State."

In the changes made, the Buganda government lost its financial autonomy. Articles 32(4) and 33(2-3) and Article 34 of the 1966 Interim Constitution strengthened the financial management powers of the central government, outlining the procedures to be followed in financial management in Buganda. The finance minister of the Buganda government had to first present the budget to his counterpart in the central government before sending it to the Buganda Lukiiko (parliament) for approval. As a result, the central government controlled the kingdom's finances and determined the size of the resource envelope. Consequently, the financial position of Buganda, the strongest of the federal states then, was brought at par with that of the other kingdoms and the district of Busoga. The central government argued that control over funds would prevent the wastage of taxpayers' money, which could have been used to fund expensive and fruitless projects such as the Ndaiga Scheme, where Baganda World War II ex-servicemen were settled in the Kingdom of Bunyoro. In the years after independence, Obote was determined to go ahead with the settling of the issue of lost counties

(i.e., territories that initially belonged to Bunyoro, but were given to Buganda by the British during the colonial era); hence, the proposed holding of the referendum in 1964. In an attempt to retain control over these territories; Buganda embarked upon bold campaigns to settle Baganda families of ex-servicemen in the two counties on a vast scale. (*Ssekanyolya*, November 23, 1963, pp.12). The most controversial settlement scheme was that of the 8,000 Baganda ex-servicemen at Ndaiga on the shores of Lake Albert in Buyaga County, to which Kabaka Muteesa II accorded legitimacy through his personal involvement (Muteesa, 1974). The aim of this was to upset the population imbalance before the referendum in 1964 and thus ensure that Buganda did not lose control over the lost counties. Despite the spirited efforts put up by Buganda Kingdom in resettling as many Baganda ex-servicemen as possible in the region, the Referendum Bill provided voting eligibility only to those who had been registered voters in the counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi during the 1962 elections. This effectively excluded the Baganda who had settled in the area under the Ndaiga Scheme. This ensured that the people of the counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi would vote in favour of their counties being taken back to Bunyoro. The scheme caused financial ruin to the veterans and systematically undermined the power of the Lukiiko to finance essential projects in Buganda.

Revenue-sharing was also halted after the adoption of the 1966 Constitution in Uganda. The Ssaza (county) Chiefs lost custody of their official estates and the rent that accrued from these estates, which was to be remitted to the regional treasury under the control of the central government, marking a stark departure from the provisions of the 1961 Buganda Constitution that had been wholly implemented in the 1962 Independence Constitution. The 1966 Constitution deprived the chiefs of the revenue they needed to manage both the kingdom's assets and the welfare of the people

under their jurisdiction. Many Baganda regarded the stripping of the Buganda government's financial autonomy as a calculated and deliberate policy, resulting in the neglect of many of the kingdom's assets. Additionally, the policy had severe consequences for the well-being of the county chiefs, their subordinate chiefs, and their dependents due to the loss of income that often comes with the loss of jobs.

Land is critical in Buganda, not only because the kingdom has a crop-based economy but also because it has been used as an instrument of political control by the king and as a cultural tool by the Baganda throughout the kingdom's history. In pre-colonial Buganda, the control of land lay almost entirely in the hands of the king. However, during colonial times, the British developed Buganda's economy into one based on the production and export of cash crops, leading to the need for the British to take part of Buganda's land. Under Article 15 of the 1900 Buganda Agreement signed between the British and the Baganda, land in Buganda consisted of two types of land tenure: crown and *mailo* land. The *mailo* land, approximately 12,800 square kilometres, was parcelled out to chiefs and leading personalities, including the Queen Mother, the three regents, and a few princes. The remaining 14,400 square kilometres was crown land and placed under the control of British colonial administrators, becoming public land for British projects.

As the country moved towards independence in March 1962, the British handed over the formerly crown land to the Buganda government under the public land ordinance (MAK, AR/BUG/1/1). The returned crown land was vested in the Buganda Land Board. Obote's land policy in the post-1966 period directly targeted the 'heart' of the Kingdom of Buganda by dismantling the Buganda land tenure system and removing control of the land from the Baganda. Obote's intention, it appears, was to

make the Baganda poor because he knew that their livelihood depended on land.

After the 1967 Constitution was enacted, Buganda lost an estimated 14,400 square kilometres of land, which was formerly crown land, to the central government. This land was vested in the Uganda Land Commission, taking it away from the control of the Buganda Land Board and the Buganda government. The 14,400 square kilometres subsequently became public land, most of which was leased to individuals who were close to the Obote regime, and who had political and financial power at a time when the Baganda, following their defeat at Mengo and the fleeing of their king to exile, were powerless. According to Lwanga-Lunyiigo (2007), the terms of the 1900 Buganda Agreement reserved this land for future generations of Buganda who had not taken a share in the 12,800 square kilometres (*mailo* land) that was parcelled out to only 3,700 high-profile people, namely the chiefs and religious organisations, such as churches and hospitals that were operating in Buganda at the signing of the agreement.

The new landowners, who were largely from outside of Buganda, used this opportunity to take over any public land they wished to own in Buganda. The loss of the 14,400 square kilometres of land was a significant blow to Buganda, as it amounted to more than half of the territorial area that made up the Kingdom of Buganda. The extent to which this land was grabbed is evidenced by the remarks made by Baguma Isoke, the then Chairperson of the Uganda Lands Commission in response to the persistent demand by the Baganda for their confiscated land. He stated that:

> I have failed to find it (the 9,000 squaSre miles) because the land that is being claimed is occupied by people who have lived on it for a long time. What remains is gazetted land such as wetlands where people are not allowed to settle. Where is the 9000 square miles? (Bukedde, June 30, 2005)

Furthermore, in addition to crown land, more land was also removed from the control of Buganda when the central government confiscated the official estates of the former kingdom officials. According to the 1967 Constitution, all official *mailo* land was added to the crown land. This category included the private estates of the Kabaka totalling 560 square kilometres and 333 square kilometres attached to the offices of the Katikkiro (Prime Minister), Omuwanika (Treasurer), Omulamuzi (Chief Justice), the county and sub-county chiefs. Each of the county headquarters covered eight square miles of land. Ssemujju, former sub-county chief of Bamunanika, recalls how he and his family were forced by government operatives to abandon his official resident to begin a new life in Busaba Village. He had to work on a new garden and begin almost afresh, which was not easy given the fact that *matooke* – the staple food of the Baganda – is a perennial crop.

Moreover, although Ugandans from outside the Kingdom of Buganda settled in droves in Buganda from the 1960s, this settlement intensified after 1966. This was largely attributed to two factors; firstly, the existence of a large expanse of newly acquired public land; secondly, the sale of land by the Baganda *mailo* landowners due to the economic hardship they faced in the post-1966 period. These economic hardships inevitably forced some landowners to sell part of their land as a means of survival. Accordingly, many nonBaganda bought and secured freehold land titles from the Baganda landowners. The newcomers even went as far as creating enclaves of their ethnic groups in Buganda and renaming their acquired land in Buganda after the places where they originated or after their ancestors. Lwanga Lunyiigo (2007) identifies Garuga along the Kampala-Entebbe Highway as such an area that replaced the Buganda name from Mbiru. Others include Kinyoro, Kifumbira, and Kitooro, to mention a few. According to (Bajjabayiira Amos, personal communication, May 06, 2001), by

turning the Baganda into squatters on their own land, Obote had succeeded in humiliating the Baganda, whose culture emphasises land ownership. To make matters worse, Obote's appointed chiefs, who acted as caretakers of the kingdom properties, especially at the county and sub-county levels, took this as an opportunity to sell off most of the land without authority.

Kalinda and Musisi (2007) find Obote's land policies particularly disturbing, as he permanently altered land ownership patterns in the Kingdom of Buganda without regard for established customary laws and structures, leading to increased land conflicts. Their observations are supported by secondary sources. Lwanga-Lunyiigo (2007:) notes that "the 'Busuulu' and 'Envujjo' Law of 1928, which had guaranteed security of tenure for peasants or tenants on their *bibanja* (plots) and eliminated land ownership conflicts in the kingdom, was repealed." This led to land grabbing, with Baganda becoming tenants on their former land and facing eviction without government support. It is alleged that in Buganda, the majority of public land is owned by ethnic groups other than the indigenous Baganda, and the loss of land remains an unresolved historical grievance for many Baganda.

Another check on Buganda's economic strength was Obote's attempt to restrict the operations of cooperative unions and societies in the region. The prosperous agricultural sector in Buganda had given rise to a strong cooperative movement that dated back to 1913. By 1949, there were over 151 cooperative societies and over 200 by independence in 1962. Members and owners of these cooperatives acquired economic power from the resulting trade. Obote was alarmed by this, as many of the societies were in Buganda and led by Baganda who were prominent in both the agricultural sector and the cooperative movement. In 1968, an Act of Parliament was passed imposing restrictions on cooperative unions and societies in the supply, storage, handling, transportation,

and processing of major cash crops, such as coffee and cotton as well as minor crops, such as beans, groundnuts, and maize. These were placed under government monopoly, depriving the cooperatives of their independence and subjecting them to government control. This was a significant setback to cooperatives that had begun processing and marketing produce and was contrary to the 1963 Act, which had granted complete managerial and financial autonomy to unions.

Under the 1970 Cooperative Societies Act, government acquired greater power for the guidance, direction, and control of the cooperative societies and unions on matters of finance and management of their affairs. Secretary managers were to be approved by government but in practice, they were appointed. As a result of this increased control, many Baganda were denied active participation in the economic direction of their country. Government control over cooperatives led to some being mismanagement. According to Bulemba and Mikaya, both members of the Namutamba Growers Cooperative Society established in 1947, this increased control led to mismanagement and eventual collapse of some cooperatives, which had a multiplier effect on the social and economic welfare of Buganda as a provincial government and the Baganda as a people. They argued that many Baganda were denied active participation in the economic direction of their country, and the appointed government officials seemed to be fulfilling government ideas rather than listening to the voices of the cooperative farmers. As a result, many farmers became demotivated and some pulled out, further contributing to the downward trend of the cooperative movement and reduced income for many Baganda cooperative farmers.

'Move to the Left' and the Economic Prospects of Buganda

After 1966, Obote appeared to be consolidating his hold on political power but neglected the economy. However, after a period of three years, he felt strong enough to embark upon sweeping changes in the economic field. One of the cornerstones of Obote's economic policies in the post-1966 era was his so-called "Common Man's Charter" or the "Move to the Left". In 1969, Obote announced that "we will now begin to acquire our true identity". Incorporated in the "Move to the Left" were five key documents adopted between October 1969 and 1970, namely: The Common Man's Charter, The National Service Proposal adopted in October 1969, Communication from the Chair, The Nakivubo Pronouncement, and the Three Plus One. The Move to the Left was passed in June 1968 by the UPC Annual Delegates Conference and adopted by the same organ on October 24, 1969 in an emergency sitting in Kampala.

The Common Man's Charter was announced on October 8, 1969, a day before the seventh anniversary of Uganda's independence, and approved by UPC on December 19, 1969. The Common Man's Charter documented Obote's socialist policies, condemning the exploitation of man by man, expounding unity of Uganda in particular and Africa in general, and stating that political and economic power must be vested in the majority. However, it was embroiled in vagueness because it was not clear whether the aim of the measures was to take commerce away from foreigners, nationalise it, or give it to Africans. For instance, the Common Man's Charter condemned capitalism, on the one hand, while guaranteeing the protection of private property on the other. It also cautiously moved against foreign enterprises and vehemently attacked communism. Under the same policies, Obote allowed Whites and not Black Africans to participate in industry, commerce, and largescale agriculture. Yet, he allowed more Asians into the lucrative commodity businesses such as the import and export trade

as well as in large-scale agriculture than ever before. To the Asians, who like Obote, shared the fear of an emergent Baganda business elite, the idea was welcomed. Such measures in place, where the government was also a co-owner, guaranteed the foreign-owned companies access to government contracts and protection from workers' demands as the government did not tolerate strikes.

When Obote officially stated that his objective of introducing the Common Man's Charter in 1969 was to reduce regional imbalances and economic differences on which regional conflicts had thrived, he had made it clear that the Baganda were his target. Contrary to Obote's argument that conflicts had risen as a result of regional imbalance, by 1969, no known economic conflicts in Uganda had arisen from ethnic economic differences, which renders Obote's argument void. Secondly, the Move to the Left's basic stand was anti-feudalism, which Obote erroneously confused with kingship in Buganda. The Charter also identified regional imbalance, particularly in production (both agricultural and industrial) and education, all of which had been dominated by the Baganda.

The hurried manner in which Obote wished to carry out his Move to the Left indicated that his goal was possibly to achieve two main objectives: winning over support from civilians and targeting and dismantling Buganda's economic power. His opponents apparently dominated the economic sector. According to Mutibwa (1992), the issue was never the desire not to follow a socialist line. In the first instance, those preaching socialism were far from being socialists themselves. The ministers, UPC functionaries, and top civil servants in the Obote government were all enjoying a lifestyle that could only be attained through corruption. In fact, Major General Amin noted in 1971 that the Move to the Left led to the creation of wealthy classes of leaders who were always talking of socialism while growing richer yet, the common man became poorer. Those who were on good terms with Obote were able to

get government contracts, jobs, and loans. No wonder Mamdani (1976) feels that Obote's government did not move to the left but simply moved against the right.

To the Baganda, Obote's Move to the Left succeeded in continuing to redistribute national income away from them. Obote was pragmatic in the post-crisis era as he increasingly allied himself with big capitalists, especially Asians who became the financiers of his government. Obote detested the reliance of wealthy, hostile Baganda businessmen dominating the economy. Thus, instead of having an economy that is in the hands of indigenous Ugandans, he handed it to the Asians, whom he considered a lesser threat than the Baganda. By doing so, Obote greatly alienated the Ugandan petty bourgeoisie, particularly the Baganda, from running the economy. Consequently, they were steadily removed from the business sector, with dire consequences. Many people were left unemployed, insecure, lacking basic needs of life, yet facing high levels of taxation.

Another important post-independence Ugandan government policy that had a profound impact on the Buganda economy was the Nakivubo Pronouncement. Issued on May 1, 1970, the Nakivubo Pronouncement, commonly referred to as NP, outlined the increased nationalisation of major industries as part of the government's commitment to enhancing socialism. The NP, derived in Section 35 of the Charter, empowered the government to nationalise private enterprises by taking over 60 per cent shares of major corporations in the country with immediate effect (Mutibwa, 1992). These numbered up to 80 corporations, among which were transport undertakings, banks, insurance companies, plantations, manufacturing and mining industries, and oil companies. State corporations, trade unions, municipal councils, and cooperative unions became the mandated authorities to run the corporations that had been nationalised.

However, the rushed nationalisation created uncertainty and implementation problems. Sir Frederick Seebohm, the then chairman of Barclays Bank, noted that "no one questions the right of governments to nationalise within their territory […] But to nationalise by instant decree and without any prior consultations is to say the least, an unfriendly gesture which is not likely to create a feeling of confidence among potential foreign investors." 'Concerns about Uganda's move to the left', *Uganda Argus*, 1971. Additionally, it became evident that the government had nationalised more companies than it could manage profitably, resulting in a contradiction when previous owners of nationalised companies were asked to manage them on behalf of the government.

As a consequence of the Nakivubo Pronouncement, the central government also took ownership of shares in a number of parastatals such as Uganda Electricity Board and Nyanza Textiles, previously owned by the Buganda government. Additionally, cash from different banks belonging to the Buganda government was seized, which was contradictory to the treatment given to foreign investors ('Charles Peter Mayiga - First Year in Office', *Saturday Vision*, July 6, 2013, p.1). Whereas foreign investors would be compensated up to fifteen years from the post-tax profits made by the nationalised corporations, the Baganda would not receive compensation. The effects of the Nakivubo Pronouncement can be best summed up by an anonymous writer who stated: "All people who were employed by Buganda are jobless, doing nothing all the time, poor day and night, all and me facing a very hard future because now we are slaves" (Anonymous letter June 1966). Furthermore, Obote's economic policies stunted the growth of Buganda's economy and curtailed the development of a Baganda property-owning class, alienating them to the point where they would always be eager to see him go (Kasozi 1994). Although Amin, who had overthrown Obote, announced a break away from the

Move to the Left calling for a more liberal economic policy in 1971 through the Kabale Pronouncement, the damage had already been done. Moreover, no efforts were made to reverse the ownership of the properties that had been transferred.

In summary, Obote's Move to the Left lacked political mass base and implementation led to discontent among the Baganda. The transfer of Buganda's institutions to the central government deprived the kingdom of its resource base on which the Baganda relied. According to Mazrui (1975), Obote's economic policies, especially his Move to the Left, aimed to prevent the Baganda from emerging as a commercial elite and remaining a powerful economic force in Ugandan society.

The Nakivubo Pronouncement was followed by the proposal of National Service, which involved taking every able-bodied person from their homes to work in a camp for two years. This proposal, as Amin pointed out, faced strong opposition among the ordinary Baganda who misunderstood Obote's true intentions. Many Baganda interpreted the scheme as Obote's plan to 'steal' their land while they were absent. Consequently, this policy further fuelled opposition to the government. During the open public meetings referred to as *baraza*, government officials tried to explain government policies and calm down the situation in Buganda. However, such attempts were met with resistance; and during one such meeting, as reported by one of the interlocutors, one man stated that "the government failed to keep its promise to safeguard the kings," and he had no confidence in the government.(Buganda Government Affairs: Intelligence Monthly Reports April 24, 1970, Masaka)

District commissioners' intelligence monthly reports from the Buganda sub-region provided further evidence of opposition to the government. For instance, a report dated April 24, 1970 by the Masaka District Commissioner noted stiff opposition to the

government in Kalungu Sub-county (Buganda Affairs, District Monthly Reports, from the District Commissioner; National Archives). The report stated that teachers seemed highly opposed to the government because of its policies, especially the Common Man's Charter and the National Service. Additionally, a school mistress at Kabukunge School in Kalungu Sub-county in Masaka District stated that the National Service was nothing short of forced labour.

Confiscations of Buganda's Properties

In line with the policy of financially crippling the defeated Baganda, the central government also confiscated several properties formerly owned by the Kingdom of Buganda. These included Muteesa II House in London, which used to accommodate Baganda students studying in London or in transit to other destinations in Europe and beyond. Muteesa II's home in Makindye, a suburb of Kampala, was converted into a State Lodge. The Makindye Housing Estate that used to house civil servants of the Buganda government was turned into a military police barracks. Kimbowa and Kyoga narrated their ordeal of being ordered to leave the housing estate. They had been employees of the Buganda government working at Bulange. Kimbowa stated that he was forced to retreat to his home area at Naggalabi and begin a new and challenging life. He said, "by then, I had not yet constructed my own house. I did stay at my ancestral home and resorted to farming since I had also lost the job." On the other hand, Kyoga went back to Bamunanika and began a new village life centred on farming. In his own words, he said, "life was not easy at the beginning to someone who had been accustomed to a monthly salary for the maintenance of the family; now one had to depend on hand-outs and cultivation" (Oral interviews).

The Kingdom farm at Kigo, some 30 miles west of Kampala, was taken over by the prisons department (Karugire, 2003;

Mutibwa, 1992). Also taken was the official residence (the 'Butikkiro') of the Katikkiro of the Kingdom of Buganda at Mengo adjacent to Mengo palace. This was in addition to all the 18 county and 73 sub-county headquarters that housed both the official administrative offices and the residences of the respective chiefs. Most of these properties had been income-generating units of the Buganda government, either by directly generating funds for the treasury or indirectly doing so by employing a significant number of the Baganda (Ginyera-Pinchwa, 1978). With the central government confiscating the kingdom's properties, the livelihood of the Baganda would be negatively affected.

To the ordinary Baganda, these turns of events injured them greatly and filled them with anger towards Obote and his UPC government. This anger was expressed in various ways, including the nationwide circulation of anonymous pamphlets and letters intended to intimidate Obote and his colleagues in government. This was done on November 21, 1968. One of such letters had the following excerpts as reproduced below:

> You robbed with armed forces Gold, Ivory, Coffee etc. from Congo. What an international robber! You robbed our 1962 constitution; you robbed our mandate after the expiry in April 1967 of your five years. Worse still you robbed our liberty of speech by keeping us dumb. You robbed Kabakaship personal properties at Mengo, Bamunanika, Nkoni and Ndaiga (all these were palaces). You robbed many Baganda and many are still being arrested…This is free excellent advice; you are digging your own grave for we shall burry you alive. We cannot be led by a small a creature known as chameleon for its constant changing of its colour as you changed your title without being elected by parliament. We all know as well as you do that rightful elected president is Sir Edward Muteesa Kabaka of Buganda who you attempted to murder in May 1966 (ENA, Box no 8/15, Miscellaneous Assorted papers only).

The above sums up the ordinary Baganda's opposition towards Obote that had indeed intensified in the aftermath of the attack at Lubiri.

Political Insecurity and Buganda's Economy

The political insecurity in Buganda resulted in the loss of investment and infrastructural decay, which had a direct impact on the livelihoods of Baganda. The breakdown of infrastructure meant that essential services were inadequate, and the inability to market produce hindered economic opportunities due to limited movement and communication within the kingdom. Obote's policy of economic exclusion, coupled with infrastructural decay, gradually weakened social and economic institutions in Buganda, such that when the kingdom was restored in 1993, it was no longer able to regain its former status.

Agriculture has been the mainstay of Buganda's economy, with the cultivation of both food and cash crops on a large scale. The Kabaka's government supported the sector through the provision of extension workers, the buying of farmers' produce, and the encouragement of farmers into group farmers' schemes that encompassed numerous farmers' clubs under the umbrella organisation of the Young Farmers of Uganda societies which had spread throughout the kingdom. These were 56 across Buganda before the 1966 crisis. There were 22 such societies in Ssingo County, 20 in Buddu County, 7 in Kyaggwe, 5 in Mawokota, and 2 in Bulemezzi. Two farm institutes at Mukono and Masaka provided technical and external services to the farmers (AR/BUG/1/5/2, Ministry of Finance Buganda government1966: Estimates of the Ministry of Natural Resource).

Also, the existence of the Buganda National Savings Scheme, owned by the Kabaka's government, aided the agricultural sector through the extension of agricultural loans. The Buganda

government also ran four major ranching schemes with various sub-ranches that provided a steady supply of animal products and income to the kingdom and individual farmers. The four schemes were: Buruli Ranching Scheme that had 27 sub-ranches; Bugerere Ranching
Scheme had 20 farms; Ssingo Ranching Scheme had 20; while Kabula Ranching Scheme had 10. By 1963, income generated from cotton had reached British pounds 1,545,540. As regards to coffee, the revenue was British pounds 9,255,830 which was 97.43% of the coffee production countrywide.

However, in the post-1966 era, the agricultural sector in Buganda experienced a dramatic decline. This decline can be traced back to the period before the Battle of Mengo. In Buganda, a chief was not merely a political office holder in the sense of exercising jurisdiction over his chiefdom. For long, his jurisdiction also went hand in hand with control of the land. This is because the Kingdom of Buganda, like many other African social formations, had been basically an agrarian society. This meant that the political system was fashioned and developed around agriculture as the mainstay of the kingdom's economy. In this regard, the chiefs had been an important link between the Kabaka's government and the grassroots of the society. Therefore, landholding and usage were linked to holding political office, and in many cases, those who held political office also supervised economic activities within their areas; both for the good of the kingdom and for the welfare of his people. In this way economic interest and political authority were harmonised in the social system, thereby giving the society political and social cohesion (Karugire, 2010).

The prosperity and prestige of a chief in Buganda were tied to the number of peasants settling on his land, which translated into increased agricultural production. Hence, as Mafeje (1998) points out, the chiefs were viewed as the driving force behind agricultural

production especially the cash crop production in Buganda. Even after peasants began to control their own produce, chiefs continued their supervisory roles. However, Obote's dismissal of Buganda chiefs in 1966 aimed to extend his control over the region and root out loyalty to the exiled Kabaka. The structural and institutional changes resulting from this dismissal negatively impacted agricultural production in Buganda. Almost all former county and sub-county chiefs were retired and replaced with new appointments. The dismissal of chiefs in 1966 by Obote had been so thorough that by 1967, hardly any of the chiefs serving the Buganda government in 1965 would be found in office. (Karugire, 2003). Indeed, 33 of the 37 new chiefs had from June 15-24, 1967 assumed their new offices. The newly appointed political chiefs, however, due to their unpopularity, abandoned the original role of providing economic guidance previously provided by the dismissed traditional respected chiefs. The new political chiefs, unpopular with the people, were appointed primarily to strengthen Obote's political control (Karugire, 2003).

The successful commercialisation of agriculture in Buganda depended largely on immigrant labour for the growing of cash crops, such as cotton, tea, and sugar cane. This labour was mainly provided by workers from other regions of the country, some coming from as far as the neighbouring countries of Rwanda and Burundi. However, political uncertainty in Buganda in May 1966 led to a drop in the inflow of immigrants to the region, directly impacting agricultural productivity. Existing labour in Buganda was inadequate, as many Baganda had abandoned agriculture for the new white collar jobs emerging with the European economy. This had a direct impact on the livelihood of the Baganda, causing subsequent economic problems relating to lack of food security, decay of infrastructure, and collapse of local economic institutions. These problems negatively affected the Baganda's ability to earn a

livelihood. Moreover, the continued existence of the state of emergency made it difficult for potential investors to consider investing in the region, leading to a distant possibility of recovery.

Conclusion

The overall economic impact of the turmoil caused by the 1966 Constitution Crisis in Buganda cannot be fully quantified. Its profound effects on the political, social, and economic progress of the Kingdom of Buganda lasted for many years after the crisis had ended. The waste of human and economic resources had lasting consequences that permanently altered Buganda's economic development and future. The crisis not only destroyed the physical, human, and social capital of Buganda but also directly reduced available opportunities for the Baganda to progress. As a result, Buganda's economy contracted, and its socio-economic progress was drastically halted.

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